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 This thesis presents a Thomistic account of divine providence and human 
freedom.  I defend and develop the traditional view by adopting some contemporary 
interpretations of it.  I argue that the Thomist solution provides an idea that divine 
providence is compatible with libertarian freedom. 
In the first chapter I provide the definition of divine providence, which is God’s 
continuing action in preserving his creation.  In another word, not only does God create 
the universe and conserve it in existence at every moment, but he also guides it 
according to his purpose.  
In the second chapter, I critically examine three solutions to the problem of 
providence and human freedom.  They are compatibilism, open theism, and Molinism.  I 
argue that the solutions are unsatisfactory in that they too easily give up some of the 
important doctrines concerning God and humans.   
In Chapter III, I develop a Thomistic account of divine providence and human 
freedom.  The Thomistic theory, I argue, well preserves traditional doctrines concerning 
both God and humans without damaging either providence or libertarian freedom for 
humans.  In particular, I briefly examine some characteristics of God, which are 




I show how human beings enjoy entire freedom in the libertarian sense although God has 
complete sovereignty over human free choices in the world.   
If the present view is correct, what makes it less attractive is that the theory 
seems to make God the author of sin.  So I finally deal with the problem of moral 
responsibility and the problem of evil and sin, showing that humans, not God, are the 
author of sin.  I contend that God wills that humans sin but he has a certain purpose for 
doing so within his providence.  But that never destroys human freedom, so humans are 
responsible for their decisions and actions.  Within the Thomistic explanation we can 
have a logically coherent view of compatibility of divine providence with libertarian 
freedom of humans.  In the last chapter, I summarize my argument and deal with some 
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According to traditional Christian doctrine, God created the world in the 
beginning (Genesis 1:1).  He directly brought it into existence from nothing.  Creatures 
exist separately from God.  But that does not mean that the created world can continue to 
exist without God’s activity.  The traditional belief states that no creature can continue to 
exist in existence unless God supports its existence.  Since only God is the creator of 
everything, it is reasonable to think that the universe continues in existence by its 
depending upon him.  Thomas Aquinas claims that God preserves a thing in a per se and 
direct way: 
insofar, namely, as the thing preserved is so dependent that without the 
preserver it could not exist.  This is the way that all creatures need God to 
keep them in existence.  For the esse of all creaturely beings so depends 
upon God that they could not continue to exist even for a moment, but 
would fall away into nothingness unless they were sustained in existence 
by his power.1 
 
Not only does God support the existence of his creation, but he also actively 
controls what will happen.  He has a certain plan for the universe, especially human 
beings created in his image, and he fulfills his goal according to the plan.  As John 
Calvin puts it, God does not idly observe from heaven what takes place on earth, but he 
governs all events as “keeper of the keys.”2 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style and format outlined in The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th edition. 
1
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. T.C. O’Brien (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1975), I, Q. 104, A. 1.  Hereafter, it will be referred to as ST, and I will use the standard abbreviations for 
the questions and article numbers. 
2
 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. 1, ed. John T. McNeill (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 202. 
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The notions of preservation and control are components of the notion of divine 
providence traditionally upheld by Christians.  Divine providence includes God’s 
continuing action in preserving His creation.  Furthermore, it includes the idea that God 
carries out his intended purposes for his creatures.3  That is, not only does God create the 
universe and conserve it in existence at every moment, but he also guides it according to 
his purpose.4 
 In the Bible, there are many texts that assert God’s sustenance and guidance.  As 
for sustenance, Jesus is described as the one who is “before all things and in Him all 
things hold together” (Colossians 1:17).  In Hebrews 1:3, Paul says that the Son sustains 
all things by His powerful word.5  These texts clearly claim that the creation would cease 
to exist without God’s continued willing it to persist.  That is, the creation does not have 
any inherent power of existence.  Rather God’s willing is directly responsible for the 
existence of the universe at each moment.6   
 As for the other aspect of divine providence, some scriptural texts claim that God 
guides and directs the entire course of events to fulfill his purpose.  God cares for his 
creation according to his good plan.  The Bible tells us that God governs human history 
and the destiny of the individual persons (1 Samuel 2:6-7).  His plan includes the 
                                                 
3
 Millard Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1998), 412.  
4
 Jonathan Kvanvig and Hugh J. McCann, “Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World,” in 
Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1988), 14-15. 
5
 See also Psalms 104.   
6
 The doctrine of God’s sustenance clearly denies the deistic idea that God has simply made the world and 
established its patterns of action so that the universe can continue to exist by its own inherent principle 
without God’s engagement in it.  See Erickson, 416-17.  The doctrine also rejects Jonathan Edwards’ 
theory of continuous creation, according to which the creation begins to exist anew at every each moment 
of its duration by God’s will.  That God sustains the universe does not mean that God makes all things fall 
back into non-being and come into being again.  God “does not engage in one type of action to produce a 
thing and another type to sustain it.”  In Kvanvig and McCann, 15.  
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accidental occurrences of life (Proverb 16:33).  Paul asserts that God “works out 
everything in conformity with the purpose of His will” (Ephesians 1:11).  In this picture, 
it is logical to say that even the sinful actions of humans are also part of God’s 
providential plan (Acts 2:23).  But God finally works for the good of those who are his 
children (Romans 8:28).  According to these texts, not only does God preserve the 
universe at every moment, but he also fulfills his plan by using every event in the world.  
Furthermore, God is believed to be perfectly good and omnipotent.  Based on these 
assumptions it is impossible that God has an imperfect plan for his creation.  His 
providential plan is always good for his creatures.  His plan also cannot be impeded by 
anything he has created. 
 The two aspects of divine providence obviously claim that the existence of the 
universe and every event in it is the consequence of God’s will.  God’s creative activity 
makes the universe exist at every moment, and makes events occur.  Furthermore, since 
God has the goal for the world, his providential will insures that events achieve that goal.  
To that end, God is directly responsible for the occurrence of every single event in time.7  
By admitting these two aspects of divine providence, we can explain God’s sovereignty 
over the creation.  The existence of the universe depends upon the creator’s will and 
each event in the world is what God wants for his purpose. 
If we believe that God’s providence involves every event, there is every reason to 
believe that he is fully involved in the course of human history.  In the Bible, God is 
described as the one who decides the destiny of every nation (Daniel 4:24-25).  Paul 
                                                 
7
 Hugh J. McCann and Jonathan Kvanvig, “The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism,” in 
Philosophical Perspectives 5, ed. James Tomberin (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), 590. 
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asserts that God makes every nation of men and he determined the times set for them 
(Acts 17:26).  Moreover, certain events God made are of special significance.  For 
example, God selected Israel among many others to fulfill his goal for salvation in 
human history.  He manifested his plan through the many events that occurred in the 
nation.  God also sent his Son into the world at a specific time and made him die on the 
cross so humans could be saved.  If Jesus had been killed like the other young infants by 
Herod when he was born, there would have been no salvation for humans and today’s 
world would be totally different.  On the scriptural account, then God’s providence has 
directed human history in a certain way that his goal could be achieved, and it is hard to 
imagine what the world would be like today without God’s active involvement in human 
history.  
The doctrine that God directs human history allows an explication about how the 
biblical prophecy is possible.  Since every course of events in the world is in God’s hand, 
he has infallible knowledge of what will happen.  So what he asserts prior to the time a 
certain event occurs will necessarily be correct.  For example, God showed Daniel which 
nations would rise and fall and the prophecy was fulfilled (Daniel 7-9).  God also 
showed many prophets what would happen in Israel and other countries, such as 
captivity in and release from Babylon (Jeremiah) and the rise of Persia (Habakkuk).  
Isaiah could prophesy Jesus’ birth and life hundreds of years before (Isaiah 53).  Jesus 
was born in Bethlehem and that was prophesied in the Old Testament (Micha 5:2).  Jesus 
knew from the first who were the ones who did not believe, and that Judas was the one 
who would betray him (John 6:64).  It is not likely that such prophetic success could 
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occur unless God has infallible knowledge about future events.  God, unlike human 
beings, does not use probable beliefs to make a prediction.  A good guess is still a guess, 
so it could be false.  It is hard to believe that all biblical prophecy would have been 
fulfilled if it were based only on a highly probable belief.  For it need not have been 
fulfilled, due to the nature of probability.  If God had just probable beliefs about future, 
what God asserted might have been false.  Definitely, that is not supported by the 
traditional view.  Rather, according to tradition, every future event in human history is in 
full control of God in his providence, so he certainly knows exactly what will happen. 
God is also sovereign in the circumstances of the lives of individual persons.  
The Bible asserts that God can cause death and create life.  He can send poverty and 
wealth and humbles and exalts (1 Samuel 2:6-7).  More seriously, God decides the 
eternal density of humans.  It has traditionally been upheld that God’s action alone is 
necessary and sufficient for salvation.  The view is based on many verses in the Bible, 
such as Romans 5: 8-9 and Ephesians 1:4-5.  According to the tradition, humans cannot 
seek God since human will is totally depraved, so that it does not have any ability to find 
a way to salvation.  Humans cannot do anything for their salvation until they have God’s 
mercy on them.  As Augustine argues, God brings it about that we begin to believe.  God, 
not humans, initiates salvation by endowing them with irresistible grace.  Since God’s 
action cannot be resisted by anything, the offer of salvation cannot be rejected at all.8  
Salvation never depends upon fallen human will or the power of man, but only God’s 
                                                 
8
 Augustine says, “He (God) has predestined His chosen ones in such a manner that He Himself has even 
made ready the volitions of those whom He has already endowed with free choice.”  In Vernon J. Bourke, 
The Essential Augustine (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991), 177. 
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grace and mercy.  According to Augustine and many others, it is obvious that humans 
can turn to God with their will, but the will is caused by God to make this turn.  Without 
God’s providential plan for each person, no one comes to have faith.   
So much for the notion of providence and its importance in Christian doctrines 
and philosophy.  God has sovereignty all over the universe and has his own providential 
plan for human beings.  However, although God is in control of every event, including 
human will and action, and indeed nothing can happen without his will, that does not 
mean that human beings do not have real freedom of the will; a person is free to decide 
and act although his freedom is dependent upon God’s activity.  In the Bible, humans are 
never described as puppets controlled by a master, that is, God.  Rather, they were 
created by God’s image and hence they, like God, enjoy freedom of will and action.  
Although there is no explicit explanation about how divine providence is harmonious 
with human freedom in the Bible, Christians have granted that both doctrines are 
compatible with each other.  So the Westminster Confession of Faith claims that “God 
from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and 
unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Yet so as thereby neither is God the 
author of sin nor is violence to the will of the creatures.”9   
                                                 
9
 The Westminster of Confession of Faith, in Documents of the Christian Church, 3rd edition, ed. Henry 
Bettenson and Chris Maunder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 320.  Modern philosophers 
also believed God’s sovereignty in a very similar way.  For example, Descartes says, “It is also certain that 
everything was preordained by God….But now that we have come to know God, we perceive in him a 
power so immeasurable that we regard it as impious to suppose that we could ever do anything which was 
not already preordained by God.”  In his Principles of Philosophy, part I, 40.  In The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 206.  But Descartes was not a fatalist.  He believed that humans were 
free although God has sovereignty over everything.  He thought that there was a way in which God’s 
sovereignty was compatible with human freedom, but he admitted that we might not be able to fully 
understand the relationship.  See the same page, article 41. 
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However, there has been a profound disagreement about how the relation 
between God’s divine providence and human freedom should be understood.  The main 
complaint is that if God preordains every event for his purpose before it occurs, and God 
has foreknowledge over the event, then it seems that humans do not enjoy libertarian 
freedom of the will.  Suppose that God preordained me to have a donut for my breakfast 
today, and so knew I would have a donut today.  No one can have power over the past, 
so I have no control over what God knew before today.  Since God’s knowledge cannot 
be possibly mistaken, it entails that the event of my having a donut will occur today.  In 
that case I seem not to have control over my action.  My having a donut today is a 
necessary consequence of a fact over which I cannot have control.  The notion of divine 
providence, therefore, seems to rule out human freedom.  The argument against the 
traditional view of divine providence and human freedom can be summarized as follows: 
(1) God has sovereignty over every event that occurs in the created world; every 
event is preordained by God. 
(2) A human being, X, is free to perform act A at T1 only if his action is not 
causally determined by any external condition other than his will. 
(3) By (1), X’s will to A at T1 is preordained by God before T1. 
(4) By (2), X is not free to will to A at T1.10 
  
As the argument shows, the traditional view seems to face a dilemma: on the one hand, 
if we focus on God’s providence, we should admit that human freedom is destroyed.  On 
the other hand, if we assert that a human being is entirely free to will and act, it comes to 
be hard to preserve the traditional view of God regarding providence.   
                                                 
10
 The argument based on God’s providence is reminiscent of a similar argument on omniscience.  See 
Nelson Pike, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” The Philosophical Review 74 (January 1965): 
33-34.  As well known, Alvin Plantinga critically examined the argument in his God, Freedom, and Evil 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), 65-73.  
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To solve the problem, theologians and philosophers have considered various 
solutions.  Strong fatalists think that only God is the ultimate agent as creator, so humans 
are not free.  Compatibilists think that God’s providence is compatible with human 
freedom, but that the freedom is not of the libertarian variety.  Some argue that since 
human beings are entirely free to decide and act without God’s intervention, we should 
give up some traditional doctrines concerning God. 
In this thesis, I want to defend and articulate the traditional account of divine 
providence and human freedom by adopting a Thomistic viewpoint.   I shall argue that 
the Thomist solution provides an idea that divine providence is compatible with 
libertarian freedom.  In the next chapter, I will critically examine three solutions to the 
problem of providence and human freedom.  They are compatibilism, open theism, and 
Molinism.  I will argue that the solutions are unsatisfactory in that they too easily give 
up some of the important doctrines concerning God and humans.  In Chapter III, I will 
develop a Thomistic account of divine providence and human freedom.   The Thomistic 
account, I believe, well preserves the traditional doctrines concerning both God and 
humans, without damaging either providence or libertarian freedom for humans.  In 
particular, I will briefly examine some characteristics of God, which are timelessness 
and his activity as the First Cause.  Based on these features of God’s nature, I will show 
how human beings enjoy entire freedom in the libertarian sense although God has 
complete sovereignty over human free choices in the world.  If this view is correct, what 
makes it less attractive is that the theory seems to make God the author of sin.  So I will 
finally deal with the problem of responsibility and the problem of evil and sin, showing 
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that humans, not God, are the author of sin.  I will contend that God wills that humans 
sin but he has a certain purpose for doing so within his providence.  But that never 
destroys human freedom, so humans are responsible for their decisions and actions.  
Within the Thomistic account we can have a logically coherent view of compatibility of 
divine providence with libertarian freedom of humans. 
 Before I discuss the main issue, I want to address some assumptions about God.  
I follow the traditional conception of God, according to which is that he is an absolutely 
perfect being.  In Anselm’s words, God is to be thought of most fundamentally as “that 
than which no greater can be conceived.”11  Specifically, God is, first of all, omniscient 
or all-knowing.  He knows all and only true propositions.  His knowledge is entirely 
infallible and it does not change.  Second, God is omnipotent or all-powerful.  He can do 
everything that is logically possible.  Third, God is wholly good.  His plans and action 
are always aimed at the perfect goodness.12  Finally, God is creator and has sovereignty 
over the universe.  He created the universe ex nihilo and maintains it with his plan.  
These four assumptions underlie Christian philosophy and perfect being theology, and 





                                                 
11
 I cited this phrase from Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1991), 35. Anselm’s basic idea of God is interpreted to mean that 
God is “the greatest possible being, an individual maximal perfection.”  See the same page. 
12
 Hugh J. McCann, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2001 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/providence-divine/>. 
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                                              CHAPTER II 
NEITHER COMPATIBILISM NOR OPEN THEISM NOR MOLINISM 
 
To solve the problem of divine providence and human freedom, philosophers 
have suggested various solutions.  They can be categorized into three main theories, 
strong compatibilism, strong incompatibilism, and Molinism.   
I want to begin by examining compatibilism.  The basic thesis of compatibilism 
is that determinism is compatible with human free will.  Here a standard characterization 
of determinism states that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.  
When it comes to human action, determinism asserts that all actions are determined 
ultimately by factors external to and not under the causal control of their agents.  It is 
worth noting that compatibilism is different from fatalism or hard determinism, 
according to which determinism is incompatible with human freedom so humans are not 
free.  Theological fatalism asserts that God’s providential plan of a human act makes the 
act necessary and hence unfree. A human person cannot perform any act freely because 
God’s sovereignty cannot fail and hence what God preordained necessarily occurs.13  On 
this view, human freedom is regarded as an illusion. 
Compatibilism, however, does not assert that humans are not free although it is 
true that their actions are causally determined by events external to them.  Unlike 
fatalists, compatibilists argue that free will is compatible with determinism in such a way 
                                                 
13
 For an detailed argument for theological fatalism, see  Linda Zagzebski, “Recent Work on Divine 
Foreknowledge and Free Will,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 46-47.  
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that an agent can perform an action if she decides to perform it and she can refrain from 
performing the action if she decides not to do it.  So long as an agent can decide and act 
as she wants, then the fact that the action is determined by external events is not to be 
understood as robbing her of freedom.   
Many Christian philosophers can be labeled theological compatibilists, but the 
modern champion of the doctrine is Jonathan Edwards.  Having a strong belief in God’s 
sovereignty and infallible knowledge, Edwards argues that human free decisions are 
determined by God’s decree: 
Nothing in the state or acts of the will of man is contingent…. God does 
decisively, in his providence, order all the volitions of moral agents, 
either by positive influence or permission… if we put these things 
together, it will follow, that God’s assistance or influence, must be 
determining and decisive, or must be attended with a moral necessity of 
the event.14 
 
In the text Edwards clearly claims that God’s providential involvement in individual 
persons determines their volitions.  Even though a decision is a future event, it is not a 
contingent event since it is predetermined by the determinate order of divine decree; any 
future decision necessarily follows from the antecedent event on God’s side.  But 
Edwards does not remain a determinist.  He does believe that humans are free although 
their actions are determined by God’s will, because they act according to the previous 
inclination they have.  Indeed, without any inclination or disposition an act cannot be 
performed, for “that act which is performed without inclination, without motive, without 
end, must be performed without any concern of the will.  To suppose an act of the will 
                                                 
14




without these, implies a contradiction.”15  Edwards believes that it is not possible that the 
will rise up against any inclinations for: 
as long as prior inclination possesses the will, and is not removed, it binds 
the will, so that it is utterly impossible that the will should act otherwise 
than agreeably to it.  Surely the will can’t act or choose contrary to a 
remaining prevailing inclination of the will.16  
 
It is clear, according to Edwards, that a human person performs his action according to a 
desire he previous has.  He “never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, 
or desires anything contrary to his will.”17  That is, desires necessarily determine the will 
since the latter cannot be contrary to the former. 
 It is obvious that Edwards believes that having a predominant desire for A is the 
same as deciding to A, and that such desires causally determine the agent’s action.  
Based on the view, he claims a compatibilist idea that that a person is free so long as he 
can do as he desires: 
The plain and obvious meaning of the words ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty,’ in 
common speech is power, opportunity, or advantage, that anyone has, to 
do as he pleases.  Or in other words, his being free from hindrance or 
impediment in the way of doing … as he wills.18 
 
The text cited shows the very idea of compatibilism.  In this picture, our willing of 
choice or decision is a necessary consequence of our desires.  But we claim to be free 
since we can perform an action that we want to do and we can refrain from performing it 
if we decide not to perform it.   
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 333.  
16
 Ibid., 205. 
17
 Ibid., 139. 
18
 Ibid., 163. 
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 If Edwards’s view is correct, the notion of divine providence will not be 
destroyed and the freedom of human will also will be secured.  God’s decree causes 
every course of human desires and eventually their decisions and actions.  By doing this, 
he can have complete sovereignty over individual humans as well as the entirety of 
human history and can achieve his goal for humankind.  But humans are said to be free 
since they still decide according to their desires.  They decide as they please. 
 Edward’s compatibilism is, however, untenable.  One problem concerns the 
relation between desires and decisions.  It is doubtful that strongest desires are the same 
things as decisions.  Desire is a dispositional state, whereas decision is a conscious and 
intentional act.19  I might desire to fly to the sky.  Though it is impossible for me to fly to 
the sky, there is no irrationality in my saying, “I desire to fly to the sky.”  But if I say, “I 
decide to fly to the sky,” and decide to leap off the roof of a building to fly, that decision 
is definitely irrational.  Desire and decision are different sorts of thing. 
The difference between desire and decision is very crucial.  I might desire to A 
but not decide to A because my desire is changed before I make a decision.  Suppose 
that I desire to go to a Chinese restaurant at t.  But my desire does not necessarily make 
me decide to go there because I might change my desire at t1 and decide to go to a 
Korean restaurant for some reason.  My desire to go to a Chinese restaurant is not an 
intentional state but just an inclination, so it is not a fixed mental state.  That stage is not 
enough for making a decision yet.  But my decision to go to a Korean restaurant is 
clearly an intentional state, not an unstable state like desire.  When I decide to go there, I 
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 Hugh J. McCann, “Edwards on Free Will,” in Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, ed. Paul 
Helm and O.D. Crisp (Aldershott, England: Ashgate Press, 2003), 37. 
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already intend to decide to go there and I intend to decide a course of action to carry out 
the intention such as finding out how to get to the Korean restaurant and thinking of 
what to eat there.  Desire, in contrast, does not have that kind of commitment attached.20   
 So decision is a different state of mind than desire.  We do not decide just in 
virtue of having a predominant desire.  Furthermore, whether a cause is a natural or a 
divine one, if our willing is caused by external events to our control, it will be hard to 
see how we enjoy freedom of the will.  We do not decide and act because our mental 
states cause us to do so, but we decide and act in a way in which we can control them.  
Here is the true locus of agency.  We voluntarily exercise our will to perform an action 
and hence we can be responsible for it.  Only if that is the case are we fully responsible 
for our decisions and actions.  If Edwards’ compatibilism is true, the true locus of 
agency will not be secured.  Even though he believes that humans are free to decide and 
act, they cannot be free within the causal theory.  It is hard to see how they freely choose 
a course of action when their decisions are completely determined by God’s action prior 
to their deciding.  If a decision is caused by a desire and God is the ultimate cause of the 
desire, human willing will come to be just a passive event.  Although Edwards’s 
compatibilism gives us a strong conception of God’s providential control, it does not 
provide an explanation of freedom of human will.  Unless we want to give up the idea of 
libertarian freedom, his theory is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of divine 
providence and human freedom. 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 38-39. 
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 Let’s turn to open theism.  Some libertarians, unlike compatibilists, argue that 
since it is certain that humans enjoy entire freedom of the will, we need to consider a 
change in the traditional doctrine of God.  The distinctive feature of theological 
libertarianism is its thoroughgoing anti-fatalism.  According to libertarians, God creates 
humans as entirely free beings in the libertarian sense, so even he cannot know what 
they will do.  Richard Swinburne thinks that God limits the range of his knowledge by 
creating entirely free creatures: 
If our universe is created by God and the human beings in it have free 
will, then the limitation that God cannot know incorrigibly how those 
humans will act will be a further limitation which results from his own 
choice to create human beings with free will.  Choosing to give others 
freedom he limits his own knowledge of what they will do.21  
 
Swinburne goes on to say that the truth value of future contingent propositions, 
especially concerning human free actions, is not determined until the events occur.  But 
this does not hurt the idea of omniscience: 
But if propositions about the future actions of agents are neither true nor 
false until the agents do the actions, then to be omniscient a person will 
not have to know them.22 
 
Some libertarians have recently developed this view under the name of open 
theism.  For example, Clark Pinnock, a theologian, argues: 
If choices are real and freedom significant, future decisions cannot be 
exhaustively foreknown.  This is because the future is not determinate but 
shaped in part by human choices…. The future does not exist and 
therefore cannot be infallibly anticipated, even by God…. God knows 
everything that can be known – but God’s foreknowledge does not 
include the undecided.23 
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Pinnock, like Swinburne, believes that propositions about future free choices are neither 
true nor false until the decisions are actually made.  Thus, for future contingent 
propositions, even God cannot distinguish the true propositions from the false ones.   
But open theists do not believe that God cannot know anything about the future.  
They contend that God knows future contingent truths in a probabilistic way.  William 
Hasker, the most well-known open theist, says that although free actions logically cannot 
be known with certainty, God “has a vast amount of knowledge about the probabilities 
that free choices will be made in one way rather than another.”24  By knowing 
probabilities of beliefs he has, God can have a plan toward us.  But, since his plan is not 
based on prior knowledge of how we will act, God takes a risk in making it.  God’s 
knowledge is determined by the actual occurrence of future events, so his plan toward us 
is also influenced by our actions.  Within this theory it is natural to think that God’s plan 
might fail.  God knows that his will might not be done, but he freely chooses to create a 
world in which he gives humans libertarian freedom.  In this sense, God is “a risk-taker.”  
He “opens himself up to the real possibility of failure and disappointment.”25 
Open theism adheres to a very strong theory of the libertarian freedom.  Open 
theists maintain that we are not caused or determined by anything outside our control.  
We are the ultimate agents who decide and act.  Even God cannot intervene in our free 
choices; otherwise, he would destroy the freedom of the will.  In this sense, open theism 
appears to solve the problem of human freedom in the dilemma above.  It could also 
suggest a promising response to the problem of evil.  Only human beings are the author 
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of sin since they freely choose to sin.  God cannot be involved with future free choices 
of humans so he cannot be involved with the sin-event in any way.   
In Michael Dummett’s words, open theism is a kind of anti-realism, according to 
which one cannot know truth and falsity about undecidable sentences, especially those 
that involve some time in future.  Open theists reject a realistic position, according to 
which a sentence is true or false and there is no third value other than truth and falsity.26  
But one striking thing is that Dummett supports the anti-realistic position only about 
human knowledge; he believes that humans are finite creatures who are not omniscient 
or perfect to know about the truth value of a future contingent event.  Open theists apply 
the position to God’s knowledge by maintaining that even God cannot know the truth 
value of a proposition about a causally undetermined future event before it occurs. 
Open theism, therefore, preserves human freedom at a very high cost.  It is 
obvious that it destroys the concepts of omniscience and sovereignty.  Christians 
traditionally have believed that God knows the future in all of its detail.  
Epistemologically speaking, knowledge is justified true belief.  S knows that p if and 
only if (1) p is true, (2) S believes that p, and (3) S is justified in believing that p.27  Thus, 
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God knows that p, a proposition about my future free choice, if and only if (1) p is true, 
(2) God believes that p, and (3) God is justified in believing that p.  Open theism denies 
(1); they contend that God does not know whether p is true or false since my choice has 
not yet occurred.  God cannot know p’s truth value until my choice actually takes place.  
Instead, God could have some beliefs about my future choices.  God could have a highly 
probable belief, say 98% certain, that I will have a donut for my breakfast.  But 
according to the conditions of knowledge, the belief is not knowledge yet since it could 
be false because of the 2% possibility that things might go otherwise.  There could be 
probable beliefs but there is no probable knowledge.  So if God’s belief is not 100% 
certain, it cannot be knowledge.  If open theism is correct, God cannot have any 
knowledge, but just probable beliefs about future contingent events.  Then it comes to be 
obvious that open theism denies the idea that God has knowledge of future free choices 
and eventually rejects the notion of omniscience, which is one of the most important 
Christian doctrines.   
It is hard to believe that God, like us, has to wait until some particular time to 
know about a contingent event.  The denial of omniscience is not supported by the Bible.  
For example, Jesus told Peter, “Tonight, before the rooster crows, you will deny me 
three times.”28  He did not say that it was highly probable that Peter would deny him.  
Rather, Jesus’s belief was true knowledge and Peter exactly did what Jesus prophesized.  
                                                                                                                                                
Gettier problem are still important issues in contemporary epistemology.  But in this thesis, I assume that 
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If open theism were true, it would be hard to see how Jesus was able to know what Peter 
would do.29  Open theism cannot explain how biblical prophecy works. 
Since open theism denies God’s omniscience, it cannot adhere to the traditional 
doctrine of divine providence.  It is odd to argue both that God has a providential plan 
toward us and that God does not know whether certain future contingent events will 
occur.  It is hard to see how God is in total control of every event with only probable 
beliefs.  Not surprisingly, when probabilities of events are multiplied, probability of the 
events taken together decline.  So, as Thomas Flint points out, “God’s control of his 
world, especially his long-range control, is drastically diminished.  For long-range 
probabilities are a function of short-range ones, and when probabilities are multiplied, 
they swiftly decline.”30  A probable belief could be true and could be false.  If God does 
not certainly know its truth-value, his providential plan could be based on a false belief.  
God’s plan might fail because there is always a chance that what God did not expect will 
occur.  He might not be able to achieve his goal.  A great many events, whether good or 
evil, are taken out of God’s hands.  Although open theism could preserve the idea of 
human freedom, it does not provide an account of how God can be in control of every 
event in human history.  Open theism does not satisfy most Christians.31   
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Finally, I want to examine the theory of middle knowledge or Molinism.  
According to the theory, developed by the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit, Luis de 
Molina, there are three kinds of God’s knowledge. God’s natural knowledge is a 
knowledge of all “necessary truths whose truth is independent (or prior to) any free act 
of will on God’s part.”32  Examples of such knowledge include “One plus two equals 
three,” “Nothing is both blue all over and yellow all over at once,” and “Every triangle 
has three sides.”  God’s free knowledge is a knowledge of a contingent event whose 
truth is dependent on God’s free will so God could have prevented its truth by creating a 
totally different situation.  Such knowledge includes “Michelangelo painted the ceiling 
of the Sistine Chapel,” “There is a computer on my desk,” and “The color of my pencil 
is yellow.”  God could have brought it about that the propositions were false by his will.  
The third kind of knowledge God possesses is middle knowledge.  The object of middle 
knowledge is a contingent event which is not dependent on God’s will.  Molinists think 
that God’s knowledge of human future decisions stands between God’s knowledge of 
necessary truths and his knowledge of his own creative will; human decisions are both 
contingent events and are beyond God’s control.33  God knows human free choices by 
using a conditional proposition so the object of middle knowledge can be called 
counterfactuals of freedom.  God’s middle knowledge describes what people would 
freely do if they were placed in possible situations.  Consider the following propositions:  
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(1) If person S were in circumstances C1, S would freely do X 
(2) If person S were in circumstance C2, S would freely do Y. 
 
God is able to actualize circumstances C1 and C2 and knows what S would freely do in 
each situation. But the actualization of S’s choice is not up to God but S.   
God knows all possibilities of S’s choice in every possible situation in which S 
can act freely.  The knowledge is logically prior to God’s creative will and God uses it 
when he decides what to create. God “has complete control over which feasible world 
will become actual” because God surveys the feasible worlds prior to creation and 
chooses one of them.34  By combining the knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom with 
his decision of what to create, God is able to know what future free choices will occur.  
So in his middle knowledge God knows my free decision prior to my existence and my 
actual act.  By knowing the counterfactuals of freedom for every set of circumstances in 
which I can freely decide and act, my free choice comes to be a contingent event which 
is independent of God’s will and at the same time God comes to have sovereignty over 
my decision and action. 
Is Molinism a reasonable theory of divine providence and human freedom?  The 
theory appears an attractive solution in that defenders of it try to preserve both 
providence and human freedom.  However, it faces a serious problem.  If Molinism is 
true, it can be said that God does not gain knowledge about future things directly but 
indirectly in a sense that he uses a kind of deductive reasoning.  According to the theory 
of middle knowledge, God applies modus ponens to subjunctive conditionals like (1) and 
(2) above to know about future events.  God does not know what S would freely choose 
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until he creates possible circumstances in which S would be.  In the process God has to 
use the rule of modes ponens to know every possible consequent of every possible 
antecedent.  But why does God, the Creator, have to depend on one of his creations to 
know truth of a contingent event?  It is hard to believe that God, who created every rule 
of logic, cannot gain knowledge without using it.  If we believe that God is the creator of 
all things, we should also believe that God is able to know human free choices without 
any aid of his creation.  God’s ability to have knowledge cannot be limited by anything 
created by him.  
A more serious problem with Molinism is that it is not clear how God could gain 
such knowledge.  As I mentioned above, God knows that p if and only if (1) he believes 
that p, (2) p is true, and (3) he is justified to believe that p.  One problem with Molinism 
is concerned with the condition of justification.  Let me briefly explain why the 
condition is essential to knowledge.  Suppose that right after John’s wife goes to a mall 
for shopping, heavy rain suddenly starts.  John does not have any evidence that his wife 
has taken her umbrella.  John comes to worry that she might catch a cold because of the 
rain and wishes that she had taken her umbrella.  From the strong wishful thinking, John 
believes that she has taken an umbrella.  Suppose that his wife actually took her 
umbrella when she left, and this was unknown to John.  In this case, John believes that 
she took her umbrella and the belief is true.  But it is not knowledge because his belief is 
not based on some relevant evidence but some strong wishful thinking.  Although his 
belief is true, it cannot be said that he knows that his wife has an umbrella now since he 
is not justified to believe it; he does not have any reason to believe it.   
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This kind of problem applies to Molinism.  For God to gain knowledge, he must 
be justified to believe propositions, that is, he must have reason to believe them.  But 
what kind of justification could God have for believing the propositions that are 
supposed to be middle knowledge?  The object of middle knowledge is not a necessary 
truth but a contingent one.  It is not a necessary truth that if I were in circumstance C1, I 
would freely have a donut for breakfast today.  Middle knowledge is not the object of 
God’s natural knowledge.  So it is obvious that the justification God could have is not a 
priori.  Then is middle knowledge a posteriori knowledge, which is gained by 
experience?  It seems not.  According to Molinism, it is not the case that God gains 
middle knowledge from my actual behavior, that is, by observing that I actually make a 
decision to have a donut today.  God does not wait to know the truth of free creatures’ 
decisions until they actually decide, since from the beginning he knows which creatures 
and situations he is going to create and thereby knows with certainty that they are going 
to decide and act in certain ways.  If middle knowledge is neither a priori nor a posteriori, 
how is God justified to accept beliefs which are supposed to be middle knowledge?  It 
seems that Molinists do not suggest some other justification for middle knowledge.  God 
could believe certain counterfactuals of freedom but his belief is not enough to be 
knowledge if he does not have any reason to accept it.  If there is no epistemic 
justification concerning middle knowledge available to God, the existence of it should be 
doubted.35  
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So far I have argued that Edwards’s compatibilism, open theism, and Molinism 
do not give us reasonable explanations of the relation between God’s providence and 
human freedom.  Compatibilism does not preserve the pure agency of humans by 
making no difference between desire and decision although it provides a very strong 
notion of providence.  With open theism, the notion of God’s providence is seriously 
destroyed although human freedom is well secured.  With Molinism, the notion of 
middle knowledge is unacceptable due to its ambiguous position. 
These theories are unsatisfactory, so we need another theoretical model.  In what 
follows, I will argue that God’s providence and libertarian freedom of humans are 
compatible with each other on a Thomistic theory.  It does not destroy either of the two 
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A THOMISTIC VIEW ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND HUMAN FREEDOM 
 
Thomistic Assumptions 
  In the first chapter, I introduced two aspects of the notion of divine providence.  
Not only does God preserve the existence of the universe, he also directs the entire 
course of events in it according to his plan.  If God sustains the universe and guides all 
the events, it is obvious that there are no contingent truths independent of his will.  
Rather God makes them exist in the universe.  They cannot exist without God’s willing 
them to be true.  That naturally leads to an idea that God’s knowledge cannot be 
determined or caused by something external to him.  Put differently, creation cannot 
affect the creator but only vice versa.  Indeed, according to Aquinas, God is the first 
cause of all things.  He claims, “God’s knowledge is the cause of things.  For God’s 
knowledge stands to all created things as the artist’s to his products.  But the artist’s 
knowledge is the cause of his products, because he works through his intellect.”36  He 
goes on to say that it is logical that “if certain things are going to happen, God 
foreknows them; but the things that are going to happen are not themselves the cause of 
God’s knowledge.”37  As first cause, God knows a proposition about a contingent event 
by ordaining or freely willing that it be true.  It is not the case that God knows a future 
event because it has happened.  If a real occurrence of an event were a cause of God’s 
knowledge, that would destroy the idea of God’s sovereignty as creator in that God’s 
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knowledge depends on the created feature.  It also would violate divine omniscience 
because God would not know anything about the future until it really happens.  In order 
to explain God’s omniscience, we should admit that God’s knowledge does not depend 
on creation at all.  And only such an idea can be the base for explaining God’s 
providence and sovereignty as creator. 
 At this point, it is very worth noting that the way in which God knows future 
contingent events is not that God knows them before they will occur but that he knows 
them as they actually do exist now.  This is probably the most important conception in 
Thomistic account of God.  According to Aquinas, God is not in time but outside of time, 
that is, God is timeless.  Aquinas says: 
Whatever is found in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as 
being present to it, although with respect to some other time be it past or 
future.  Something can be present to what is eternal only by being present 
to the whole of it, since the eternal does not have duration of succession.  
The divine intellect, therefore, sees in the whole of its eternity, as being 
present to it, whatever takes place through the whole course of time.  And 
yet what takes place in a certain part of time was not always existent.  It 
remains, therefore, that God has a knowledge of those things that 
according to the march of time do not yet exist.38 
 
In this text, Aquinas holds that God, unlike us, does not experience events as past, 
present, and future.  It is wrong to say that God has existed, that he exists now, or that he 
will exist forever.  God does not exist within the temporal framework in which his 
creatures exist.  Rather, according to Aquinas, God exists timelessly.  Temporal terms 
cannot apply to God.  If God existed in time and created all creatures, time would be one 
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thing God did not create.  This denies the idea of God as the creator of all.  Moreover, if 
God were in time, he would be subject to the limitation of time.  He would have to 
experience temporal differences as we do.  He would have to wait for a certain time 
when he wants to do an activity in the world.  It is hard for Christians to believe that the 
supreme creator is confined to doing his activity within his created thing, time.  
Moreover, if God existed in time, he would not be able to have complete sovereignty 
over the world since he does not know anything about the contingent future until it 
occurs.  Aquinas avoids these problems by claiming that God exists atemporally.39 
Since God is outside of time, God does not, as we do, know all contingent future 
events successively but “all at once.”  God’s knowledge is “measured by eternity, as is 
also his existence.”40   A timeless God knows every event from eternity so all the events 
that happen in time are present to him. 
Therefore, it is not correct to say that God knows a future contingent event e 
prior to its occurrence.  God’s knowledge is not foreknowledge because his belief about 
e was not in the past.  Rather, just as a center of a circle is simultaneously related to 
every point of its circumference, so God’s knowledge from eternity is simultaneous with 
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a temporal event.41  That means that God does not know a future contingent event by 
means of inference from present events.  For example, God’s knowledge is not 
dependent upon modus ponens, that is, P→Q, P, then Q.  Although the logical rule is 
correct, God does not use it to gain knowledge.  His knowledge is not dependent upon 
his creation.  Rather, a timeless God knows directly all contingent events from eternity. 
Aquinas says: 
God knows all contingent events not only as they are in their causes but 
also as each of them is in actual existence in itself…. Hence all that takes 
place in time is eternally present to God…because he eternally surveys all 
things as they are in their presence to him.”42 
 
Indeed, a contingent event already exists in some sense because as, we discussed above, 
God atemporally knows every contingent event by willing that it occur.  Since God has 
providence and is omniscient and timeless, God knows a contingent event in its actual 
existence and it is eternally present to God.  God knows a contingent event because he 
wills it.  So Aquinas holds that “the divine intellect through its knowledge is the cause of 
things.”43  In this sense, God’s knowledge and God’s will are identical to each other; 
God’s knowing that p is the same as God’s willing that p be true.  It can be said that in 
the Thomistic picture, God knows that p through only one mode of knowing, that is, 
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“executive self-knowledge.”44  So the contingent event cannot exist independently of 
God’s willing.  God wills that a contingent event exist, and thereby he knows the truth 
value of the corresponding proposition.  In this way, God comes to be omniscient and 
has sovereignty over the event. 
 So far I have presented some important Thomistic assumptions about God.  They 
are summarized as follows: 
 Thomistic Assumptions (TA) 
(1) God preserves his creation and enacts his intended purposes (divine 
providence). 
(2) Due to divine providence, there are no contingent truths independent 
of God’s will.  God knows contingent propositions by willing them to 
be true. 
(3) God is timeless so every event is present to him eternally.  He knows 
each event immediately. 
 
 Here every contingent event is literally everything in the universe.  Definitely it 
includes human decisions and actions.  Then we face a very significant issue of the 
relation between divine providence and human fee will.  If God ordains human will, then 
it seems that humans are not free to will and act.  If humans are entirely free, it seems 
that God’s providence and omniscience are violated.  How can the Thomist view 
accommodate both God’s providence and a libertarian freedom?  In what follows I will 
deal with this topic. 
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Compatibility of Divine Providence and Human Freedom 
 If TA is correct, human will and action must be subject to God’s will because 
they are also contingent events in the world.  First, God preserves our existence.  
Without God’s sustenance of our existence, we cannot will and act.  We as creatures do 
not have any inherent power of existence.  God is directly responsible for our existence 
at each moment.  Moreover, God has a certain purpose for our will and action.  He 
fulfills his plan by using every event in an individual human’s history.  No human will or 
action is outside of God’s providential plan.  Second, there is no human willing or action 
independent of God’s will.  God is the first cause of our willing and action.  God knows 
what we will do by willing the event to occur.  God’s knowledge is the cause of human 
willing and action.  Aquinas says that “God is for us the cause not only of our will, but 
also of our act of willing.”45  He goes on to say that “every movement of the will must 
be caused by the first will, which is the will of God.”46  It is not the case that our 
decisions and actions determine God’s will and knowledge.  The former is temporal and 
something temporal cannot be the cause of something eternal.47  Finally, our will and act 
are present to God eternally.  His knowledge is simultaneous with every event on our 
side.  It is wrong to say that he knew before T1 what I would do at T1.  Rather God 
eternally knows my action and it is already existent to God eternally.  
 Given TA, it is certain that God’s providence is well preserved.  But what about 
human freedom?  If my will and act of decision are subject to God’s plan and his will, is 
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it possible that I am free to will and act?  First, we need to see how Aquinas answers the 
question.  At this point it is worth noting that Aquinas never supports fatalism.  Rather 
he rejects it.  He believes that although God is the first cause of human willing and 
action, that does not mean that they are determined by God.  According to Aquinas, God 
does move human will but he does that without violating human freedom so humans can 
perform their actions voluntarily: 
And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their actions 
from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive 
their actions of being voluntary; but rather is He the cause of this very 
thing in them, for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.48 
 
When God wills my decision, he makes me freely make a decision.  Although my 
decision is a consequence of God’s will, I am free to voluntarily make the decision.  
When I make a decision, God does not take the voluntary power of doing the action 
away from me.  In this way, my voluntary act of deciding is not violated by his will and 
the action comes to be mine.  God wills my action and at the same time I am free to act.  
Here my will and act are not the cause of God’s will and knowledge although I am free 
to voluntarily will and act.  My act of deciding is still in God’s control and so God can 
fulfill his plan within his providence.  If God is not the cause of my decision and he 
cannot do anything about my decision at all, there is no way in which God can guide it 
according to his plan.  If we believe that every event in the universe occurs within God’s 
providence, it follows logically that God controls human will.  For Aquinas, the two 
aspects, providence and human freedom, are compatible with each other and either of the 
two is not violated at all. 
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 But some might complain about the Thomist viewpoint, for it still seems to 
violate human freedom. They might argue that this view faces an objection that since 
God determines human decision and action in some way, God’s action destroys human 
freedom.  If God brings about a human decision, for example, that John freely chooses to 
go fishing, John cannot decide otherwise, so John is not free to decide to go fishing.  
Critics could argue that the Thomistic account of providence and human freedom is an 
event causal theory, according to which God’s will is a cause and it produces an effect.  
In Donald Davison’s terms, God’s will is the reason that John chooses to go fishing.  
John does that because God wills that he do so.49  In this case, John’s deciding is passive 
and involuntary because God’s will, an event independent of John’s decision, causes his 
decision.  John comes to be like a puppet manipulated by a master.  For the critics, 
Aquinas’s explanation appears very ambiguous because when he says that God moves 
human will, that exactly means that God causes humans to will and this does not offer 
any guarantee of human freedom.  For this reason, they think that the Thomistic account 
eventually leads to a version of fatalism, according to which the only free agent is God, 
not a human being.  Human will is determined by God’s will, so humans cannot enjoy 
libertarian freedom.   
 I think this complaint results from some misunderstanding of the Thomist 
viewpoint.  I want to show that the Thomist view gives a reasonable account of both 
divine providence and libertarian freedom.   
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 According to TA, all of our willing and action come from God’s will.  And for 
every contingent event E, including human free actions, God’s knowing that E is the 
same as God’s willing that E.  Now consider the following propositions:50 
(1) John freely chooses to go fishing. 
(2) God wills that John freely choose to go fishing. 
 
The Thomist holds that the truth of (1) does not determine the truth of (2).  As we have 
discussed above, something temporal cannot determine something eternal but only vice 
versa.  He also believes that the truth of (2) necessitates the truth of (1); God is the first 
cause of John’s willing.  But the Thomist does not believe that (2) is causally prior to (1).  
In other words, it is not the case that the truth of (1) is determined by the truth of (2) 
before (1) happens.  Why?  For TA (3) asserts that God is timeless and God’s will is 
eternally simultaneous with every event in the universe.  That is to say, (2) is eternally 
simultaneous with (1).  The relation between the two propositions is not characterized by 
a causal relation because every causal relation is involved with some temporal features.  
A cause must be prior to an effect.  But given TA, God’s will and knowledge are not 
subject to time.  It is wrong to say that God’s willing that John freely choose to go 
fishing occurs prior to the event that John freely chooses to go fishing.  Rather the 
proposition (1) is present to God eternally. 
 Therefore, if we accept TA, then we should admit that (1) and (2) are not 
causally connected to each other.  Rather we can say that (1) is identical with (2).  That 
is to say, the truth-maker of (1) is the same as the truth-maker of (2).  So in every world 
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in which (1) is true, (2) is also true.  It is impossible that (1) is true and (2) is false in a 
world or (2) is true and (1) is false in another possible world.   
It is very important to note that although the truth-maker of (1) is identical with 
that of (2), this does not mean that the degree of each agent’s control of the decision of 
going fishing is less than 100%.  It is not the case that God’s responsibility for John’s 
decision is 60% and the remaining 40% is up to John.  Nor is it the case that John is 
more up to his decision than God.  The Thomist believes neither a partial fatalism nor a 
partial open theism. 
With this in mind, consider following propositions: 
(3) Karl, a baby, picks up a pencil. 
(4) Mary, Karl’s mom, wills that Karl pick up a pencil.  
 
Mary could directly move Karl’s arm and hand, making him grab a pencil.  Or Karl 
could pick up a pencil under threat of Mary’s punishment; he knows that he will not eat 
if he does not do what his mom asks him to do.  In this situation, it is obvious that Karl’s 
decision to pick up a pencil is not fully up to him because it is caused by Mary’s will in 
some way.  Perhaps Karl’s degree of control of his action is less than the degree of 
Mary’s control.  In this sense, in order for Karl to choose his action, Mary’s willing must 
be joined to his willing.  Mary’s will plays a role as a prior cause of Karl’s action.  In 
this case, therefore the truth-maker of (3) is not identical with the truth-maker of (4). 
 Definitely the example of Karl does not fit with the Thomist viewpoint.  In (1) 
and (2), there is no distribution of the degree of control over the single event.  It is 
impossible that in order for John to perform his act of decision, God’s act is joined to his 
act as temporally prior cause.  Nor is it possible that John’s willing must be joined to 
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God’s willing in this way.  Rather, each agent enjoys a 100% degree of control of the 
decision to go fishing.  The decision is 100% up to John while it is also up to God at the 
equal degree of control.  But there is no temporal, causal connection between the two 
actions because at the moment of God’s willing that John choose to go fishing, John 
decides to go fishing.  The timeless God wills what John does so his decision is always 
present to God eternally. 
 The fact that (1) is identical with (2) shows both that God is in control of John’s 
decision and that at the same time John is entirely free to make the decision.  John’s 
decision is not caused by God’s will before he makes the decision.  Indeed, John’s 
decision is fully up to him although it comes from God’s will.   
 It is obvious that within the Thomist theory, a human being is entirely free in the 
libertarian sense although his will is subject to God’s will timelessly.  There are two 
conditions of libertarian freedom.51  One is spontaneity.  My action is free only if I 
voluntarily control the action.  I do not make a decision accidentally or involuntarily.  
The decision does not just happen to me, but I am actively involved with it.  A decision 
is entirely in my control and hence it is mine.  The other condition is intentionality.  I am 
free to decide to do an action only if I do intentionally.  There is no unintentional 
decision.  In making a decision, I intend to decide.  When I decide to A, I intend to 
decide to A, and I intend to decide exactly as I do.  In this sense, the act of deciding is 
intrinsically intentional.52  Intentionality is intrinsic to the decision.  It is worth noting 
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that this phenomenon of intentionality is basically teleological.  I intend to decide to A 
not because some things cause me to decide to A but for the sake of attaining some goals 
by A-ing.  Exercises of agency “have to be undertaken for the sake of some objective the 
agent deems worthy of attainment.”53 
 These two aspects of action are sufficient for a libertarian freedom.  When I 
decide, I know that I am the very agent who decides.  I am consciously aware that I am 
freely making a decision and no other things cause me to do that.  Also, I am conscious 
of my intention of deciding.  I intend to decide to A to achieve some objectives I think of 
as valuable.  I certainly decide for a reason and that can explain why I decide to A.  But 
that does not mean that the reason causes me to decide to A.  Rather, I decide to A for 
the sake of achieving some goals and the intention is the reason itself.  I form an 
intention and the content of it reflects the goals that I want to achieve.  I am not 
controlled by reason, but I see myself as freely controlling my decision by forming an 
intention.  So my deciding is not a causal process but a teleological one.  My decision 
does not just befall me.  I do not decide to A by accident or unintentionally.  My act of 
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deciding is both conscious and purposive toward some objectives and I am certain of the 
phenomena.   The two features provide me with a perfect libertarian freedom of the will. 
 This view obviously rejects any kind of causalism or determinism for human will 
and act, according to which every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.  
Causalists argue that every truth about the future is determined by the past fact in 
conjunction with the laws of nature.  The most important feature of the laws of nature is 
that no one can render them false.  One cannot change the truth of “The earth spins 
around the sun,” or “Magnets attract iron.”  As for the past event, no one can change the 
truth value of the past fact.  The truth of the proposition that Bush was reelected in 2004 
cannot be changed in any way.  According to causalists, a current event is related to the 
past event with the laws of nature; it is caused by them in a nomic way.  My mental 
states shaped by past events in conjunction with the laws cause my decision.  There are 
only nomic relations between my will and belief states.  On this viewpoint, ‘I’ am not 
the active agent but I am controlled by other states of affairs.  I decide to A because 
some of my mental states cause me to decide to A and so I cannot do otherwise; there is 
only one possible future.54  So in the determinist theory one’s spontaneity and 
intentionality are destroyed.  Within causalism, it is hard to see how I can be fully aware 
of the process of deciding so I can control my act of deciding.  And I choose to A not for 
the sake of achieving a goal but because of my reason-states cause me to decide A. 
 Let’s turn to the case of John in which he freely chooses to go fishing.  It is 
obvious that he spontaneously decides to go fishing if there is no coercion or 
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interference to force him to decide to go fishing.  He exactly knows what he decides.  He 
is clearly aware of his deciding to go fishing, and his decision is entirely under his 
direction.  Furthermore, he has a certain reason to go fishing.  He might want to take a 
rest at a beautiful lake by enjoying his favorite thing.  He might desire to be a champion 
of a fishing competition.  He does not decide because the reason state causes him to do 
so, but he intends to decide for the sake of achieving his goal.  His act of deciding is not 
accidental but intentional.  Since he has both spontaneity and intentionality for his 
decision, he entirely enjoys libertarian freedom of will.   
  In the example it is clear that God’s willing is not a past event and that there is 
no causally nomic relation between John’s decision and it.  If God’s willing is a past 
event, that would destroy the notion of the timelessness of God.  If God were in time, it 
would be possible to say that his willing caused John’s decision in a deterministic way.  
But this is not the Thomist view we have discussed so far.  In the theory God is outside 
of time and eternal.  So even though God’s willing is the cause of John’s decision, that 
does not mean that the former causes the latter in a deterministic way.  Rather the 
relation between his decision and God’s activity is too close for there to be any temporal 
differences.   God’s determination of his decision is not a separate event from John’s 
decision.  In fact, John’s act of deciding is the content of God’s will that he decide that 
way.55   
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 So we have dual aspects of a single event.  One is that a human agent is entirely 
spontaneous and intentional in her action, so she is entirely free in the libertarian sense.  
The other aspect is that her will comes from God’s will.  Her will is a contingent event 
and according to TA, there is no contingent event independent of God’s will.  So a 
human will cannot be independent of his will.  God wills her will not in temporal way 
but in atemporal way so a human will comes to be present to God eternally.  But her will 
is not involved in any causally deterministic factor. 
 I believe that only this Thomist view can explain both divine providence and 
libertarian human freedom.  Human beings are created by God and sustained in being 
entirely by God’s will.  Since humans are creatures, they cannot exist by themselves.  
Furthermore, they cannot decide and act apart from the creator’s will.  God is the first 
cause of every human will and thereby he can be fully in control of a human action.  By 
doing this, God directs the entire course of human events, eventually fulfilling his 
purpose.  In this way every human will is involved with divine providence.  But humans 
are entirely free to decide and act since they are not caused by God’s will but 
simultaneous with it in conjunction with their spontaneity and intentionality.  God does 
not cause humans to do certain actions.  As James Ross puts it, “God does not make the 
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person act; he makes the so acting person be.”56  A determinist account is good for 
preserving God’s providence, but it destroys human freedom.  Open theism can explain 
human freedom but it cannot provide a good account of divine providence and so 
destroys God’s nature.  But the present Thomistic account does not hurt either divine 
providence or human freedom; it provides a logically coherent explanation of both.    
 
Responsibility and the Problem of Sin 
 I have argued that the Thomist view preserves both God’s providence and 
libertarian human freedom.  But some people might argue that the view makes God the 
author of sin because he wills everything that a human being does.  According to the 
present view, a human being cannot decide anything without God’s will.  Then if he 
decides to commit a sin, God’s will must be involved with the decision.  Consider the 
following two propositions: 
(5) John feely decides to kill Mark. 
(6) God wills that John feely decide to kill Mark. 
 
According to the Thomistic account, the truth-maker of (5) is the same as the truth-
maker of (6).  John’s act of deciding is the content of God’s act of willing that he decide 
so.  Since John is a creature and his decision is a contingent event, he cannot make any 
decision without God’s activity.  Due to this fact, critics argue that God is involved with 
John’s decision to kill Mark in such a way that God is the author of the sin, or at least a 
sinner along with John.  How can the Thomist deal with this problem? 
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 It is true, according to the Thomist view, that God does will that John decide to 
kill Mark.  In this sense, God is involved with the decision and is responsible, with John, 
for the existence of the sin.  They are co-responsible for the decision.  But that does not 
follow that God incurs the equal blame for the evil decision.  For when John decides to 
kill Mark, the decision is fully up to him if he does spontaneously and intentionally.  We 
can apply the two features of libertarian freedom to the issue of moral responsibility.  
John incurs blame for evil only if he performs the action with a clear consciousness of 
what he is doing.  His act of decision does not happen to him but he voluntarily engages 
in the decision; so his action is his, not that of anyone else.  Suppose that John is 
determined to kill Mark by other facts.  He might be manipulated by another person, 
Paul, who really wants to kill Mark.  He puts a computer chip into John’s head so he can 
fully control the process of his making decisions.  Paul makes John make a decision to 
kill Mark.  In the case, it is hard to say that John is guilty of killing Mark because he 
cannot engage in his volition freely but his decision is just manipulated by Paul.  His 
decision to kill Mark is responsible only when he spontaneously makes it. 
Furthermore, one incurs blame for evil only if he acts intentionally.  When he 
performs his act of will, he exactly knows what he is doing since he does not decide 
accidentally or unintentionally.  He intends to decide to do an evil thing in order to 
achieve a certain goal.  If he does not have any intention to do the evil thing, it is hard to 
blame him for moral evil.  Suppose that John kills Mark unintentionally.  Mark might be 
hit by John’s driving car by accident.  Mark might die when John pushes Mark to the 
wall for fun and his head is hit by the wall accidentally.  In the case, John does not have 
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any intention to kill Mark.  His intention does not include killing someone, so he is not 
guilty of Mark’s death.  But when John intends to decide to kill Mark, he definitely 
becomes a murderer. 
One is morally responsible for sin only if he commits it spontaneously and 
intentionally.  Suppose that when John decides to kill Mark, he is clearly aware of what 
he decides and does have a certain reason, for example, to steal some money from him.  
His decision is not caused or manipulated by others and it is not made accidentally.  He 
is consciously and actively involved with killing Mark in order to achieve a certain goal.  
In this case, it is obvious that he incurs blame for the murder since he is entirely free to 
do the act of deciding in the libertarian sense.  His decision and action belong fully to 
him.  If he freely decides to kill Mark and he actually kills him, he, not any other, is 
responsible for the decision and the act. 
And according to the present view of providence and human freedom, God does 
not cause John to decide to kill Mark.  As we have discussed in the last section, the 
relation between (5) and (6) is not a causal one, that is, (6) does not causally necessitate 
(5).  God does not cause John to decide to kill Mark. God is not like Paul, the 
manipulator, in the example above.  Nor is it the case that 50% of the responsibility for 
the decision is with God and the rest of it with John.  It is not the case that God’s will is 
joined to John’s decision as cause to effect.  He does not cause him to kill Mark. God 
does not make John decide to kill Mark, but he makes him deciding.57   
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God is the ground of John’s being and his decision; he makes the so deciding 
person exist, not causing him to decide.  In this sense, God is somehow responsible for 
John’s decision to kill Mark.  Without God’s will, John cannot so decide and Mark’s 
death cannot occur.  But although God is responsible not only for John’s decision but 
also for its efficacy, that is, Mark’s death, the act of killing Mark, that is, of doing that 
nomically causes his death, is predicated only of John and belongs only to him.  It is 
John, not God, who performs the act of deciding with a certain intention.  The act of 
deciding to kill Mark entirely belongs to John.  So John, not God, commits the sin. 
Furthermore, whether one is guilty of a moral evil is determined by whether he 
breaks a law or a rule which he has to obey.  If we believe that God is the source of 
morality, that is, he has the ultimate moral authority so he can establish moral laws, he 
cannot sin.  For sin is defined as rebellion against God and the meaning of rebellion is 
determined by the moral authority.  Then it is absurd to think that God rebels against 
himself.  God cannot break moral laws or rules which he has established.  Therefore, it is 
impossible for God to sin in his position.58 
If we believe that we are free to decide and act, there is no reason to think that 
God makes us sin and hence is the author of sin.  If we enjoy libertarian freedom, it is we 
that decide and act.  If we do something wrong, we deserve to have moral responsibility 
for it.  
Now let’s turn to the problem of evil and sin.  Why does evil exist?  Why did 
God the Sovereign permit humans to sin?  Some atheists take the questions very 
                                                 
58
 McCann, “The Author of Sin?” 15 
  
 44
seriously and use them to attack theism.  For example, J. L. Mackie argues that the 
existence of evil and sin is inconsistent with the existence of God.  Theists believe that 
an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God exists.  But to be sure, evil exists in 
the world.  Mackie argues that these two statements are not consistent with each other.  
If we believe that the first statement is true, we should reject the second one.  But it is 
hard to believe that evil does not exist.  If the second statement is true, one of the 
assumptions about God must be rejected.  Perhaps then there is something it is 
impossible for him to do, that is, create a being who always freely chooses the good.  
Mackie believes that this fact destroys the doctrine of God’s omnipotence.  He also 
argues that if we believe that God permits evil for some reason, it is also reasonable to 
think that he is not wholly good.  Mackie concludes that God’s “failure to avail himself 
of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good.”59   
A popular response to Mackie’s challenge is to argue that the existence of God 
and the existence of evil are logically compatible by showing that both the proposition 
that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good and the proposition that evil 
exists in the world can possibly be true even if they might not be in fact true.  One way 
to show that the two statements are logically possible is to find a third statement whose 
conjunction with the statement about God is consistent and entails the statement about 
evil.  The strategy underlies the so-called the free will defense.  Alvin Plantinga, the 
representative philosopher of the free will defense, thinks that the idea of possible 
worlds helps us to find the third statement.  A possible world is “a way things that could 
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have been” or “a possible state of affairs.”60  Plantinga stipulates a possible world in 
which God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness are related to human 
freedom.  First, he thinks that a free world is a better and more valuable world than a 
world containing no free creatures.  Here a free choice always has to do with plurality.  
That is, that I freely choose A entails that I choose it rather than another option.  I claim 
to be free to choose A only if there are other choices like B or C or not-A that I can 
freely choose.  If there is no choice other than A and hence I have to choose it in every 
situation, I am not free in my deciding.  Based on the viewpoint, Plantinga argues, “God 
can create free creatures, but he cannot cause or determine them to do only what is right.  
For if he does so, then they are not significantly free after all; they do not do what is 
right freely.”61  In order for us to be free to decide to do what is good, God must not 
determine us to do so.  We must have a power to not do the good or to choose what is 
evil.  So Plantinga goes on to say: 
To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, he must create 
creatures capable of moral evil; and he cannot leave these creatures free 
to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so.62 
 
Within this possible world, we are entirely free to decide and act, so the source of moral 
evil is fully up to us in that we human beings have gone wrong in the exercise of our 
freedom.  So the fact that we free creatures go sometimes wrong “counts neither against 
God’s omnipotence nor against his goodness; for he could have forestalled the 
occurrence of moral evil only by excising the possibility of moral good.”63   
                                                 
60
 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 45. 
61
 Ibid., 166-167. 
62





From the scenario, Plantinga extracts the third statement at issue.  A basic idea of 
it is that although God is omnipotent, it is not within his power to create a world 
containing only moral good but no moral evil.  That is, in order for God to provide 
human beings with the entire freedom to do good and evil, God’s ability to control them 
must be limited in some way.  So it is possible that God would create a world of free 
creatures who choose to do evil.  The third statement is that it is “possible that God 
could not have created a universe containing a moral good (or as much moral good as 
this one contains) without creating one containing moral evil.”64  This statement, in 
conjunction with the statement that an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God 
exists, entails that evil exists.  That is, it is possible that both God and evil exist in the 
world and the statement refutes Mackie’s charge that God could create a free creature 
with a guarantee that they would never sin.   
Such a kind of free will defense appears very attractive for some reasons.  First, 
the defense well preserves the value of human freedom without destroying the traditional 
beliefs about God’s nature.  If one believes that what God can do is only logical things, 
the notion of omnipotence is not destroyed.  For, according to Plantinga, it is not 
illogical that God creates a world in which a human person freely chooses to do evil.  
God’s power of omnipotence is “limited by the freedom he confers upon his 
creatures.”65  Furthermore, it gives us a good account of moral responsibility.  According 
to the free will defense, like the present Thomist view, it is we who sin.  We are not 
determined or caused by God to do something wrong; but we do it with the exercise of 
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free will, so only we deserve blame for the sin.  God is not the author of sin, but we are 
sinners.  This is possible because God created significantly free creatures who produce 
moral good.   
However, I think that the defense is not a sufficient account to be a good model 
for theodicy.  Mackie could still ask why God does not create human beings who freely 
choose only righteous things.  For it is logically possible that an omnipotent, omniscient, 
and wholly good God could have created a world containing free creatures who always 
do what is good.  So Mackie argues that “if God has made men such that in their free 
choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he 
not have men such that they always freely choose the good?”66  The free creature could 
always make good decisions spontaneously and intentionally, and that could preserve 
God’s providence and human freedom.  That is, God could guide and direct human 
beings to freely decide only good things so they can always do good works.  Their 
decisions are not caused since they consciously do the act of deciding in order to achieve 
good consequences.  If God is omnipotent, it is logically possible that he could have 
created the free creature who can freely choose to do what is good.67  Atheists could 
think that if God cannot make this kind of human being, some traditional beliefs about 
God would be defeated.  Another problem is that the free will defense cannot explain 
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natural evil, although it can explain moral evil as just mentioned above.  Humans cannot 
bring about natural evil.  Only natural causes bring about natural evil.  The free will 
defense is only concerned with the moral agency of humans, not natural causes.  So it 
cannot explain why natural evil happens in the world.  But a more serious problem is 
about human freedom.  How much are humans free?  The free will defenders argue that 
it is logically impossible that God creates free creatures who are causally determined by 
some events outside of their control.  But if that means that humans are entirely free 
without God’s will, the defense is untenable because it insists that there are contingent 
facts independent of God.  That is, whether a person performs or refrains from 
performing an action would be fully up to her, not God.  Then the free will defense 
threatens some of God’s nature.  For example, God’s knowledge of my action comes to 
depend upon whether I will actually do it.  God does not know my performance of evil 
until I will do it.  So if this view is correct, it is hard to explain God’s sovereignty over 
my evil action.  If God’s knowledge depends upon human, temporal events, it is hard to 
see how God can control human actions, whether good or evil, to fulfill his plan.  
Furthermore, the free will defense seems not to provide an explanation of the origin of 
moral evil.  Those who support the view could claim that moral evil originates from the 
abuse of human wills.  According to them, human beings, say Adam and Eve, freely did 
not obey God’s commandment, and that is the origin of moral evil.  But does that mean 
that the moral evil was out of God’s control?  Did God not know that Adam and Eve 
would eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge?  Then did God not know something wrong 
would happen until they did it?  If moral evil results only from human decisions and 
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actions with their exercise of free will, then there is no way to explain how God knows 
whether humans sin and how he can control the event. 
To be sure, the free will defense does not fit with the Thomist view.  As we have 
discussed, the Thomist view does not admit any contingent event, even a human act, 
independent of God’s will.  Like the free will defense, it too claims that God does not 
determine or cause human decisions and actions and thereby humans enjoy entirely 
libertarian freedom.  But God is directly and intimately involved with them by willing 
them to occur.68  The same happens to the occurrence of sin.  Since it is also a contingent 
event, it cannot exist without God’s will.  God wills sin to exist in the world.  Since the 
free will defense does not capture the point, we need another model for theodicy in terms 
of the Thomist view, especially the idea of providence.  I want to suggest an idea.  
Why does God create human creatures who can freely sin?  I admit that there is 
no perfect answer to the question.  But one of the best answers I can think of is related to 
the idea of God’s providence.  It is this: the fact that we sin is needed for our own benefit 
in a sense that God wants to share his being and goodness with us, and we can be such 
God-like only if we realize that we are weak beings who often sin.  Let me explain this 
point. 
According to the Christian tradition, a human being is a unique and precious 
being since only this creature was created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27).  A human 
being, unlike other creatures, has some reflection of God’s nature intrinsically, and 
hence only he is able to have a personal relationship with God.  He is a manifestation of 
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 McCann, “The Author of Sin?” 6. 
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the existence of God and his nature.  God’s perfection and power are manifested in other 
creatures, but it is in intelligent beings like humans that they are best revealed.  God did 
not create human beings as puppets, but as free and moral agents so that they can 
voluntarily communicate with him and share his creativity and goodness in the world.  
So the relationship between God and human beings is much more valuable than the 
relationship between God and other creatures, such as animals and natural objects.  The 
former is a person-to-person relationship, whereas the latter is person-to-object.  God 
really wants humans to find him voluntarily and try to have a fellowship with him.  If 
humans are just caused by God to love him, they cannot have a true fellowship.  Suppose 
that I make some characters by using some computer programs.  When I turn on my 
computer, they are supposed to show up on the screen.  To be sure, I can be in control of 
everything about them because I am the creator of them.  I can make them praise me and 
say they really love me.  They smile at me and even cry because of their ‘sincere’ love 
toward me.  Would I be happy for their praise and confession of love?  Could I have a 
real personal relationship with them?  Neither would I be happy nor could I have a 
fellowship with them, because they are not real persons and they are determined to 
praise and say they love me, so there is no voluntary action in them.  But if real human 
persons, who are not caused by others, praise me and say they love me with all their 
hearts, I will definitely be happy, since I know they are persons like me and they 
voluntarily do the act.   
 Likewise, in order for God to have a true, personal fellowship with us, we must 
voluntarily perform our acts toward God.  A true fellowship is “a matter of mutual 
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commitment.”69  Both God and we must voluntarily love each other.  We must 
spontaneously and intentionally choose to love God.  Here it has to be remembered that 
a free choice has to do with plural options.  That is, in order for us to be free to find God, 
there are at least two options we can choose.  If we can love God, then it must be that we 
can disobey him.  If that is not possible, we cannot be free to choose to love God.  But it 
is worth noting that the existence of plural options we can choose is not just a logically 
necessary condition for our being free, as in the free will defense.  It is not just a 
metaphysical, logical possibility but must be a real experience in us.  Put differently, in 
order to have a real fellowship with God, we have to experience both what it is to love 
God and what it is to disobey him.  As Hugh McCann points out, “guilt, remorse, a sense 
of defilement, and the hopeless desolation of being cut off from God cannot be 
understood in the abstract, because if they are only understood abstractly they are not 
ours. Only through experience can we understand what it means to be in rebellion 
against God, and we gain that experience by sinning.”70  Then there is a good reason to 
think that that we sin is a necessary condition for our being voluntarily and personally 
choosing to love God.  We really need God’s love and voluntarily accept his offer of 
fellowship only if we understand that we are sinners who are separated from him and 
that we will be miserable without having a personal relationship with him.  True 
fellowship with God cannot begin until we realize the poor condition of ourselves.  Since 
it is possible that we sin, we know what the good and the evil are and hence we can be 
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morally responsible for our decisions.  It is “only from a stance of sinfulness that we are 
able to settle our destinies in an informed, responsible, and morally authentic way.”71   
If the view is correct, sin is a process through which we are getting more morally 
mature and eventually becoming God-like.  God can share his perfection with his 
intelligent creatures who are developing their moral level.  In terms of divine providence, 
God uses the sin event to help us become morally mature.  So the whole purpose of 
creation is to bring imperfect beings to more perfection so that God and they can enjoy 
personal fellowship.72  As Aquinas puts it,  
There is no question of the first agent, who is purely active, acting in 
order to achieve some purpose; he intends only to communicate his own 
completeness, which is his goodness. Each and every creature stretches 
out to its own completion, which is a resemblance of divine fullness and 
excellence.  Thus, then, divine goodness is the final cause of all things.73  
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God’s providence concerning sin is to create beings who can share his perfection as 
much as possible.  The existence of sin is the best way to achieve his ends for us.  God 
creates a sin in some sense, but he does so only out of his love toward his creature.  
Given that sin exists, God is able to direct it in such a way that much more goodness is 
produced out of it.  Specifically, God wants to use evil to help us be more mature so we 
can be more conformed to his likeness,74 and eventually be his “friends.”  He creates sin 
as a necessary condition of our coming to share his friendship.  The eventual goodness is 
not personal pleasure or personal health or wealth.  Rather, it is real fellowship with God, 
who is our creator.  In this sense, that we freely sin is a necessary evil which can lead to 
the fulfillment of God’s purposes within his providence. 
A sin event is a process within God’s providence to fulfill God’s purpose.  It is to 
be understood in terms of God’s plan for us.  When he wills that we sin, he has his own 
intention, which is different from ours.75  The story of Joseph in the Bible is a good 
example showing the point.  To his brothers, who sold him to Egyptians long time ago, 
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view can explain why they did not choose otherwise.  For this reason, the view can overcome a weakness 
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Joseph says, “You intended it for evil, but God intended it for good.”  His brothers 
spontaneously and intentionally sold their little brother, making him a slave in Egypt.  
But when God willed what they did, he had another reason for it.  God’s plan was for 
good, whereas their intention was for evil.  Perhaps, the most striking and dramatic story 
in the Christian tradition presenting this point is of Jesus’ death.  People in Israel 
crucified him on the cross.  Their decision was not caused or determined by any other 
exterior factors to them.  But it was a contingent event, so they could not make the 
decision without God’s will.  To be sure, they spontaneously and intentionally did 
something evil so they deserve to blame for it.  But God’s intention for the event was not 
just that Jesus should die on the cross, so people incur blame for it.  They certainly 
intended the crucifixion for evil, but God intended it for good, that is, saving all humans 
and restoring the relationship with them.  People had a reason for their decision and 
action but God had another reason, which was more profound than theirs.  He, unlike 
them, had “sufficient reason” why they should decide to crucify Jesus.  His reason fully 
explains the occurrence of the sin event in terms of his perfect goodness.  But again this 
does not mean that people do not have any moral responsibility.  It was they, not God, 











The view I have presented preserves both divine providence and human freedom.  
A timeless God freely chooses to create an intelligent creature who can decide and act 
spontaneously and intentionally.  God wills every course of human action, and hence he 
can be in control of it according to his plan.  At the same time, humans are free in the 
libertarian sense since their decisions and actions are not caused or determined by 
anything at all other than themselves.  So humans do have moral responsibility for their 
decisions and actions.  If they can spontaneously and intentionally decide and act, it is 
they, not God, who sin although they cannot sin without God’s will.  A timeless God is 
intimately and directly involved with the occurrence of sin.  The reason God creates 
human beings who feely sin is to give them a real freedom and to have a real, personal 
fellowship with them.  It is only the sin-experience through which humans seriously feel 
that they are sinners so they voluntarily try to find God.  God uses the sin-event to fulfill 
his plan within his providence.  
If this view is correct, it provides a very interesting idea of us as human beings.  
We live normative lives in a descriptive feature.  As for descriptivity, we have our being 
in the creator.  Our decisions and actions come from God’s creative will.  His creative 
will describes our history according to his plan.  He has a certain purpose for us and 
eventually accomplishes it within his providence.  In this sense, the relationship between 
God and us is analogous to a relationship between an author of a novel and her 
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characters.  In the novel, the character’s being is in the author.76  Characters decide and 
act in the novel but that is what the author describes.  She describes a story by showing 
lives of characters.  When she does that, she does have something to tell her readers.  
She wants to deliver a certain message to them.  Likewise, God as the author of human 
history creates our decisions and actions.  He directs and guides every course of action to 
manifest his existence and love toward the world.  He freely chooses a certain outline in 
which human history is to be described and performs his creative activity according to it. 
His sovereignty and intention are directly involved with every event in the world.   
Although God is the author of human history, that does not mean that we are like 
his puppets.  As I have argued above, we are free in the libertarian sense only if we 
decide and act spontaneously and intentionally.  There is no event-causal relation 
between God’s will and our decisions.  God does not make us act but makes us exist as 
acting persons.  It is we, not God, who decide and act.  So we are responsible beings as 
well as free beings.  When we spontaneously and intentionally do something wrong, we, 
not God, deserve blame for it.  So any normative features of our decisions and actions 
are not destroyed within the present view.  We are entirely free to obey or disobey God’s 
word so we are responsible for our decision of obedience or disobedience.  This also 
suggests to us that we not be fatalists but can be activists on moral evil.  We should not 
think that all moral evils are what God wants in the world for his plan so we do not have 
to worry about them and we just wait God’s judgment on them.  This fatalistic idea is 
mistaken.  It is just an event-causal understanding of God’s will and human freedom.  
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Within the determinist theory, moral evil is a consequence of a causal relation between 
God and human beings so they are not responsible for their evil actions.  But the 
Thomist view does not support the idea of fatalism.  As I have discussed, the author of 
moral evil is not God but humans since they are entirely free to choose their actions.  
They have moral responsibility for all of their decisions and actions and they deserve 
blame for wrong doings.  So there is every reason to judge them according to a certain 
moral principle.  We can criticize those who do evil and try to stop the spread of the evil 
over the world.   
Therefore, although we are like characters in a novel and God is the author, our 
first-person integrity is not violated at all.77  Indeed, we do not have to worry that we are 
manipulated by God as a puppet is manipulated by a human master.  If I think that I am 
manipulated by God, that thinking is fully up to me.  I am entirely free to think that I am 
manipulated by God.  Then my ability to think is not manipulated by God and I who can 
freely think exist as I do.  If I doubt I am not free, that proves that I am a free being.  In 
my part, I am entirely free so I can do everything I want and I am responsible for it.78 
Due to the first-person property, we are not just characters in a novel or in Matrix.  
For example, in Matrix, people decide and act spontaneously and intentionally although 
all of their decisions and actions are manipulated by an evil computer.  However, people, 
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except for Neo and his friends, do not know they are manipulated by it.  In the case, it is 
hard to say that people in Matrix enjoy libertarian freedom.  But, unlike them, we know 
who the author of the novel in which we are living is.  We also know that the author is 
perfectly good so we believe that the story will be a happy ending.  Moreover, according 
to our religious tradition, we have personal relationships with the author while we still 
live in the novel.  Not only do we freely decide and act in the novel, but we also have 
knowledge of the author of the novel and have intimate relationships with him. 
So on this account we are in a very unique position.  We are free and responsible 
beings whose decisions and actions are within God’s providence.  I think that it is the 
privilege of believers that know the mysterious but profound truth.  We believe that we 
are free to decide and act, and we know that our freedom of the will is not violated at all.  
But we also believe that God within his providence controls every event, including our 
decisions and actions, in the universe, through which God will finally fulfill his good 
plan for us.  We live hoping for the day when God will fully accomplish his will in the 
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